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Abstract: Anthropological linguistics, and by default also anthropological pragmatics, grew as sub-
disciplines of both anthropology and linguistics. “The intellectual basis for anthropological linguistics 
in the United States derives from Boas ([1911] 1966), whose interests and concerns led to the 
anthropological view of language, which is that language is an integral part of culture (…)” (Klein 
2006: 296). Pragmatics enters the scene, telling the researcher how to analyse the aforementioned 
phenomena. Therefore, anthropological pragmatics would be responsible for equipping the researcher 
with tools, for it is language and language-oriented mechanisms of communication, the study of which 
provides a much clearer insight into cultural phenomena which often direct the use of language 
representing culture from both the synchronic and the diachronic point of view. “[O]ne approaches 
language from an anthropological view, which includes the uses of language and the uses of silence, as 
well as the cultural problems involved in silence and speech” (ibid.).  
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1. Introduction 
It was as early as 1927 when Edward Sapir published his work on patterning 
behaviour in society in both form and function. It is for pragmatics to research 
exactly how the cultural exchanges of meanings between interlocutors are patterned, 
and whether it is at all possible to work out models for such patterns. By means of 
applying anthropological pragmatics one can also research the “(…) relevance of 
language to the study of human behavior (…)” with particular emphasis placed upon 
“(…) the focus on linguistic meaning and how it affects behavior” (Klein 2006: 298) 
of people in their everyday activities and daily routines, as well as their exceptional 
linguistic behaviour, e.g., in moments of triumph and in anger. While pointing to 
relatively new sub-disciplines of pragmatics proper, one ought to mention that 
pragmatics itself has been for quite some time considered a subdivision of semiotics 
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and, at the same time, a kind of Cinderella subject, where “[p]ragmatics (…) is the 
study of signs (and sign systems) in relation to their users; whereas SEMANTICS is 
the study of signs in relation to their designata (what they refer to), and SYNTAX is 
the study of signs or expressions in relation to one another” (Leech, Thomas 1990: 
173). Starting from the above assumption, that pragmatics is a sub-discipline of the 
study of signs and sign systems, anthropological pragmatics broadens the research 
perspective of pragmatics proper and requires from the researcher to view their 
research as an integral part of the study of human communication, and of its 
fluctuating context. From the point of view of pragmatics, most of what can be said 
can also be classified as a part of the system of illocutions. John Searle in his works 
talked about five (basic) types of speech acts, namely: 
ASSERTIVES [that] commit S to the truth of some proposition (e.g. stating, 
claiming, reporting, announcing); 
DIRECTIVES [that] count as attempts to bring about some effect through 
the action of H (e.g. ordering, requesting, demanding, begging); 
COMMISSIVES [that] commit the speaker to some future action (e.g. 
promising, offering, swearing to do something); 
EXPRESSIVES [that] count as the expression of some psychological state 
(e.g. thanking, apologizing, congratulating); 
DECLARATIONS [which] are speech acts whose “successful performance 
… brings about the correspondence between the prepositional content and 
reality” (e.g. naming a ship, resigning, sentencing, dismissing, 
excommunicating, christening). (Searle [1975] 1979a, [1975] 1979b; cited 
in Leech and Thomas 1990: 179)    
  
Studying only actual sentences and phrases tagged as assertives, commissives, or 
declarations, would not seem complete, for they are more often than not pronounced 
on particular occasions only, and quite often by people who are premeditatedly 
stance-taking by uttering them. Hence the anthropological part of anthropological 
pragmatics is ready to equip the researcher with adequate tools to ethnographically 
describe an entire speech event which can encompass quite a few individual speech 
acts. Therefore, it does not suffice for anthropological pragmatics to quote 
somebody‟s statement, but it is also necessary to add when, to whom, and with what 
word choices the statement was made; similarly it does not suffice to quote an order, 
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a request, a promise, or an apology, but the researcher has to describe the entire 
process of communicating information, including its nonverbal circumstances, 
which can influence the meaning of the information in question.     
It is worth underlining that for the purpose of this short work, simplifying a complex 
issue somewhat, the crucial research theme of anthropological pragmatics is 
understood to be the study of the essence of language and the essence of culture in 
the form of their combined and simultaneous regularities in a specific and 
contextualized functional environment. Having said that, I automatically subscribe 
to the fact that there are “(…) two distinct scientific traditions dealing with „what we 
do‟ (i.e., our praxis): either the social science of actions and events, such as 
sociology and anthropology, or the logico-linguistic science of propositionally 
centred regularities of speech acts” (Koyama 2006: 304). The above is supplemented 
by the pragmatic tradition which includes “(…) the social sciences, sociology, 
anthropology, critical philosophy, and [large] parts of contemporary pragmatics such 
as critical discourse analysis and social pragmatics” (ibid.), but one must not forget 
also other disciplines which can take an active part in pragmatic-oriented research, 
including “(…) analytic logic, linguistics, and parts of psychology, anthropology, 
and pragmatics (e.g., ethnoscience, cognitive linguistics, and the theories of speech 
acts, implicature, and relevance)” (ibid.).           
 
2. Background taxonomy1 
Anthropological pragmatics is an integral part of anthropological linguistics, whose 
main task is to address itself to “(…) the function of speech behavior among all the 
kinds of behavior that are recognized in a society” (Silverstein 1975: 157). As 
Michael Silverstein observes, “[t]o explain social behavior, anthropologists speak in 
terms of a conceptual system called „culture;‟ to explain linguistic behavior in 
particular, linguists speak in terms of a conceptual system called „grammar.‟ It 
follows that a grammar is part of a culture” (ibid.). What is more, any given culture 
can be built by a number of different communicational grammars (see 
Chruszczewski 2002, 2003, 2006), regarding both verbal and non-verbal aspects of 
the construction of information transmission. Silverstein (1975: 158) summarizes the 
                                                          
1
 A slightly different version of this excerpt appeared in Piotr Chruszczewski (2010) 
“Language in Relation to Man: On the Scope and Tasks of Anthropological Linguistics.” 
[In:] Zdzisław Wąsik (ed.) Consultant Assembly III: In Search of Innovatory Subjects for 
Language and Culture Courses. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Filologicznej we 
Wrocławiu; 121-126. 
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above issue by saying that “[i]n terms of language, meaning is what is 
communicated each time one member of a society speaks to someone (a „speech 
act‟). In terms of social behavior, meaning is what is communicated each time one 
member of society behaves in certain ways toward someone (a „cultural act‟).” For it 
is exactly what we call social behaviour that “(…) in general communicates native 
facts about society” (ibid.). one needs to agree with Silverstein (1975: 159) that 
“[t]he rules by which a speech act presupposes certain elements of the native system 
of cultural concepts is called the „function‟ of speech act.” And that “[t]o study 
speech only for its sentential, and hence, prepositional value – which we recognize 
as unique in our European tradition – is to appreciate a fraction of the meaning of 
speech behavior” (ibid.).     
It is believed that human communication is not just about passing texts from one 
person to another, but is an elaborate process involving conceptually organizing, 
physically coordinating and verbally exchanging all sorts of information. People 
decode and encode messages based on their situational, social and cultural frames of 
reference; and it is anthropological linguistics that investigates how people organize 
their living spaces, and the ways according to which people organize their 
dynamically fluctuating symbolic systems of information exchange. From the 
historical point of view the name “anthropological linguistics” is sometimes used to 
describe investigations of languages understood as phenomena of a linguistic nature 
for anthropological purposes. One has to be aware that the term used to have a much 
broader range than it has today. An anthropological study of language, from the 
technical point of view, equates to anthropological linguistics; it differs from other 
sub-disciplines of linguistics only by its anthropological research perspective, and it 
differs from linguistic anthropology by its linguistic research methodology.     
Anthropological linguistics (see also Klein 2006) has recently become a very broad 
scientific discipline, engulfing a few other already autonomous disciplines such as 
contact linguistics, field linguistics (see Bowern 2008), sociolinguistics or 
pragmatics (pragmalinguistics). Anthropological linguistics has many common and 
convergent fields of interest with other sub-disciplines of linguistics. One can say 
that the primary assumptions of anthropological linguistics are the following: 
– deepening and systematizing knowledge regarding all human communicative 
behaviours (similar to communication studies); 
– researching human biologically constituted capabilities and communicative needs 
concerning verbal communication (similar to neurolinguistics and 
psycholinguistics); 
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– researching the quality and intensity of the inter-human contact types, leading to 
significant modifications within the human communicative environment (similar 
to sociolinguistics); 
– researching the relationships between humans and the cultural embeddings 
within which they live, and which they produce by means of their symbolic and 
communicative acts (similar to linguistic semiotics); and last but not least,  
– researching particular text types which are communicated only in specific 
situational embeddings (similar to pragmatics). 
In conducting its research, linguistic anthropology uses linguistic research tools and 
linguistic investigative methods, but does not refrain from research methods 
commonly applied in cultural anthropology, ethnography, or even in archaeology. In 
its early days it was characteristic for anthropological linguistics to place a great 
emphasis on the complementarity of: cultural anthropology, physical (actually 
biological) anthropology, archaeology, pragmatics and linguistics, which was crucial 
in interpreting the culture under discussion (many native American cultures were 
researched with the above complementarity principle in mind). The above was 
triggered by the need to find out and understand the way in which the particular 
language functioned in its broader, cultural perspective. 
Researchers of the “Franz Boas school”, i.e., Edward Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf, 
Alfred L. Kroeber, did their best in order to find out about not only the culture which 
they were investigating, but also the language of that particular culture which they 
were documenting by means of their thorough participant observation (see, e.g., 
Kroeber 1952; [1953] 1963) . It is they who can be truly called the pioneers of 
contemporary field linguistics. Among other issues it was that very method which 
helped establish the fact that there are no “better” or “worse” languages, and that all 
languages have to be investigated with reference to their own culture and users. One 
version of the above has come to be known as the principle of linguistic relativism 
or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which in its radical form does not have many 
supporters, because it would mean that it is the language which one uses that directs 
the way one perceives extra-linguistic reality. Nowadays there is no doubt that the 
human mind, while constructing meanings in communication, does not act in 
accordance with such a simple model. Nevertheless, there are reasons for the 
existence of its less radical version, proved by research data from quite a few 
languages; in other words, it is much easier to memorize or to describe objects and 
processes which have their proper names in the language used by our respondent 
(see Whorf 1956; Lucy 1992). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, even in its radical 
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version, seemed plausible until the 1950s, that is until the beginnings of cognitive 
sciences. New investigations have demonstrated that, apart from the cultural patterns 
worked out by people all over the world, linguistic complexity and the human 
potential to generate meanings need to be based upon a much firmer and more 
profound species-specific cognitive foundation. In consequence, proponents of the 
“cognitive revolution” postulated that cultural variability as seen in natural 
languages is solely a superficial feature as compared to cognitive universals 
(Wierzbicka 1996; Gumperz, Levinson 1996; Levinson [1997] 2003). What is more, 
cognitive universalism in its most radical version proposed by Jerry A. Fodor (1975) 
presupposes that all possible human concepts derive from an inborn human 
“language of thought” (see Pinker 1994: 55-82), (sometimes called also “Mentalese” 
[Carruthers 1996]), and all semantic concepts in natural languages are sheer 
projections of concepts taken from the repertoire of cognitive universals. If the 
above were true, the acquisition of the first language would come down to finding 
the proper cultural correlation between local realizations and universal meanings 
(Pinker 1994). To sum up, one can observe that none of the above hypotheses seems 
to be verifiable in its radical version, however, once one selects and links certain 
elements coming from both doctrines, then one is faced with a verifiable, quite 
reasonable and potentially productive research hypothesis.  
According to contemporary research one can distinguish two main concepts of 
anthropological linguistics, they are: culture and language, where the notion of 
culture can be comprehended as the domain of cultural practices by means of which 
people construct their social reality
2
. The entire process is conducted by means of 
linguistic communicational patterns on a highly symbolic level, due to which the 
social constructs can be maintained and changed within the minds of the 
communicating individuals as well as in the extra-linguistic reality. The leading 
theme of any research oriented towards anthropological linguistics is directed at the 
documentation of the fluctuation of meaning observed between communicating 
individuals on the basis of their linguistic practices. It is the process of the 
construction of meaning which is placed at the foundation of any discursive practice 
                                                          
2
 “If cultural practices are those meaningful practices through which humans in relationships 
sustain ongoing histories of social structure coupling, then foremost among these must be 
linguistic practices. What people do incessantly in every known society is talk. Linguistic 
practices are the most pervasive way in which humans make meanings and sustain social 
systems; they do not exhaust human cultural practices, but are clearly primary among them. 
Humans could be succinctly defined as social beings encultured through language” Foley 
(1997: 24). 
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and any research perspective embarked upon by researchers working in this domain. 
With reference to the conducted research, and on the basis of the contemporary 
overlapping investigative perspectives of anthropology and linguistics one can 
consider the following working taxonomy of the disciplines under discussion: 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LANGUAGE: 
1. Linguistic anthropology – researches relationships between culture, language and 
a specific speech community.  
2. Cultural linguistics – one of its paradigms is researching the relationships 
between: language – culture – man – reality (among other issues also the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis).   
3. Anthropological linguistics (main directions of research): 
a. Field linguistics – documents languages (including endangered and moribund 
languages).  
b. Typological linguistics – conducts research on the types of the languages of the 
world. 
c. Contact linguistics is a relatively new scientific discipline which can be 
subdivided into: 
linguistics of external-social contacts: 
including creolinguistics as a sub-discipline investigating the 
creation mechanisms of pidgins, creoles, and mixed languages; 
and macro-sociolinguistics (including sub-disciplines 
researching, e.g., language death mechanisms triggered by 
contacts between politically stronger and weaker languages); 
 
linguistics of internal-social contacts in changing situations (i.e., 
anthropological pragmatics):  
including micro-sociolinguistics as a sub-discipline investigating, 
e.g., the ethnography of speaking, communicative events,  
linguistic politeness, etc.; and pragmatics (i.e., 
pragmalinguistics), dealing, among other issues, with the 
description of the immediate situational embedding of produced 
texts. 
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3. The communicative and cultural niche construction  
Jacob Mey (1994: 3261) is of the opinion that “[p]ragmatics appears to be the first, 
historically motivated approach towards a societally relevant practice of linguistics.” 
Mey said the above having in mind a brief quotation of Sir John Lyon‟s idea regarding 
the bifurcation in linguistics: 
(…) linguistics is no different from any other science; and the point would not be worth 
stressing, if it were not the case that some linguists, out of sympathy with current 
developments, have seen a necessary opposition between what have been called 
“formalism” and “realism” in the study of language. (Lyons 1968: 50-51) 
Lyons subdivides the approaches into “structural” – i.e. more theoretically oriented and 
the more “practical” – i.e. oriented towards actual language use. As regards the tasks of 
anthropological pragmatics, let me paraphrase Mey‟s (see 1994: 3269) words , and say 
that anthropological pragmatics can also be given the task of trying to solve the 
numerous practical difficulties that are inherent in the exercise of linguistic functions. 
Quite a few of these difficulties of a communicational nature have been opened up to 
anthropological pragmatics by the study of ethnography, or anthropology proper. 
However, in order to find answers to them one needs to go beyond ethnography or 
anthropology, because they can be found only at the interface and at the crossroads of 
the social, cognitive and communicational sciences. The cultural niche construction is 
such an interface of those sciences. It was John Odling-Smee and Kevin N. LaLand 
(2009) who in their recent work presented the way in which niche-construction may 
have been evolving according to the following model: 
(1) The basic natural-evolutionary niche:  
Sources of natural selection in environments (…) provide the context in which diverse 
organisms compete to survive and reproduce, influencing which genes are passed on to 
the next generation. The adaptations of organisms are assumed to be consequences of 
autonomous natural selection moulding organisms to fit pre-established environmental 
templates. These templates are dynamic because processes that are independent of 
organisms frequently change the worlds to which organisms adopt. (Odling-Smee, 
LaLand 2009: 99-100) 
 
The niche relationship between niche-constructing organisms and their naturally 
selecting environments does not impose any kinds of bias, either in favor of natural 
selection or in favor of niche construction. Instead it allows natural selection and niche 
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construction to be modelled as reciprocal causal processes in evolution. This simple 
revision allows niche construction to be fully recognized as a cause of evolutionary 
change. (Odling-Smee, LaLand 2009: 105) 
(2) The developed social niche: 
The social niche is the subset of natural selection pressures in an evolutionary niche that 
stem from interactions with other organisms I their social groups. It constitutes the 
resources (e.g. food), services (e.g. grooming), and other outputs (e.g. threats)provided 
by organisms for each other. It also includes all the ways in which individual organisms 
can actively defend themselves, compete with, form alliances with, cooperate, exploit, or 
manipulate other organisms, and by doing so modify some of the natural selection 
pressures they encounter in their niche. (Odling-Smee, LaLand 2009: 106-107) 
 The authors argue that the social niche construction probably played a major role in the 
evolution of human societies and the evolution of language. 
(3) The complex communicative niche: 
In primates and other large-brained organisms, communicative niche construction 
typically depends on animals sending “messages” to and from each other‟s brains, in 
ways that involve a degree of learning and cognition. (Fragaszy, Perry 2003 cited in 
Odling-Smee, LaLand 2009: 108-109) 
It is very important in this regard to remember that even though primates can construct, 
develop, and profit from the communicative niche it is virtually impossible for them to 
pass precise meta-information from generation to generation or store information 
concerning their skills. 
(4) The cultural niche: 
The creation of a cultural niche requires large-brained organisms not only to have a way 
of passing information, but to have a refined tool of passing sophisticated and precise 
information both from generation to generation and over long distances. In other words, 
the creation of a cultural niche requires the possession of language, which enables not 
only the development of symbolic methods of communication but also the storage of 
previously acquired information. Those anthropologists interested in pragmatics are the 
ones equipped with the tools to research a number of phenomena involved in the 
construction and transmission of information regarding cultural niches, which vary from 
speech community to speech community.     
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4. Discursive aspects of language acquisition  
The question of anthropological pragmatics is inherently connected with the 
relationship between pragmatics – as a sub-discipline of linguistics “(…) that studies 
the relationship between natural language expressions and their uses in specific 
situations” (Bussmann [1990] 1996: 374), and the study of language as a solely 
human and biological predisposition to communicate precise information by verbal 
means. If one considers pragmatics to be “(…) defined as the study of the rules and 
principles which govern language in use, as opposed to the abstract, idealized rules 
of, for instance, grammar, and of the relationships between the abstract systems of 
language on the one hand, and language in use on the other (…)” (Malmkjær 1991: 
354), then in this particular regard, studies in anthropological pragmatics should be 
considered highly efficient for researchers studying a number of aspects of 
discourse. The research-oriented meaning of discourse can be best exposed here as 
(1): textually-constituted and socially-established dynamic power relationships, 
observed in, e.g., religion, politics, science, economy, etc., and (2): an expression of 
ideas, feelings, beliefs, embodied in various realizations of art, religion, science, and 
so on. We decode types of discourse by discovering the pragmatic functions of their 
linguistic texts or communicative events which are always embedded in their extra-
linguistic context, and by means of which types of specific discourses always 
manifest themselves. From such a perspective, discourse studies can function as a 
research perspective of a larger subject of investigations, i.e., of anthropological 
pragmatics, where language – in general – and texts – in particular – are to be 
viewed as an intricately organized and inherently human way of acquiring meanings 
for interacting with the environment. Bearing the above in mind, Bernard Comrie 
(1981: 3) is of the opinion that: 
Given the simple observation that children learn their first language so readily, on 
might wonder whether an ever stronger claim could not be made, namely that the 
language as a whole is innate. This would assume that a child born into a given 
speech community is already pre-programmed with knowledge of the language of 
the speech community, presumably having inherited it from his parents. However, 
further observation soon shows that this scenario, though clearly simplifying the 
learnability problem, cannot be correct. It would imply that a child could only learn, 
or at least would much more readily learn, the language of his parents, irrespective 
of the language of the surrounding community. Now, it is known from observation 
that children acquire, with approximately equal facility, the language of whatever 
speech community they happen to grow up in, quite irrespective of the language of 
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their parents or their more remote ancestors; this can be seen most clearly in the 
case of children who are brought up by speakers of a language different from that of 
their natural parents. (…) One can thus establish an equation between language 
universals and innate ideas: language universals would be those innate linguistic 
principles which facilitate the child‟s language-learning task. 
Comrie does not mention, however, any very important extra-linguistic prerequisites 
which presumably are necessary for a child to start speaking a given language 
surrounding the child in question. With reference to the above, one needs to add that 
it is precisely anthropological pragmatics that rushes to the researcher‟s aid with its 
research tools to help him in his investigation of, for example, children‟s methods of 
verbal interaction (also known as “baby talk” [see, e.g., Ferguson 1956]) with the 
surrounding world. Comrie seems to be saying that since all small children have two 
legs, it is universal for all children to walk, regardless of the lay of the land (all 
children have speaking apparatus, so they can speak any language). However, there 
seems to be a fault in the logic here. One cannot equate a 100% mechanical ability to 
walk with a 100% cognitive ability to speak! It seems here that Comrie makes too 
great a leap in his equation, because he does not even mention the enormous 
diversity in the natural environment in which humans happen to live. In other words, 
it may be stretching things to say that there are pan-human universals of, for 
example, a transformational nature that govern all human languages. 
The only universal phenomenon one can state with any certainty is that all children 
are born with some capacity to memorize things, happenings, and events. Thus, 
children can remember their mother, and they can also communicate with them 
using the same sounds as their mothers use. Mothers usually utter very simple 
sounds to their new-born infants, and their way of communicating with their child 
gradually becomes more and more sophisticated as the child grows older. Children 
also become very quickly emotionally connected with the person who spends most 
of their time with them – feeding them and communicating with them, so naturally 
children want to imitate both their mother‟s verbal behavior and all the other 
discursive practices observable to the child. But as regards speaking, the child 
memorizes first a number of sounds/words, then associates the sounds with 
particular larger, more intricately built into the social order cultural happenings such 
as, say, breakfast, lunch or dinner:  
CRIES (intonation, voice pitch, length of the cry, etc.); 
WORDS & EMOTIONS, e.g.: “ma ma” + smile; which means that the child most 
probably already associates the sound with the person who takes care of him; 
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WORDS & HAPPENINGS, e.g.: “da da” (going outside); “ya ya” (eating); 
WORDS & culturally defined EVENTS, e.g.: brunch, tea, dinner, etc.). 
The last phase of a child‟s learning is the stage of understanding larger culture-
specific units, such as, for example, “going to grandma‟s for Sunday lunch”. Such a 
large unit can be built of smaller sub-units such as: “dressing nicely”, “buying 
flowers for grandma”, “greeting nicely”, “behaving oneself at the table” which can 
include the proper usage of culturally suitable table utensils, and this is precisely the 
stage where researchers of anthropological pragmatics still have much research to 
do.  
As regards the development of children‟s complex communicational patterns, Kern, 
Davis and Zink (2009: 205) researched 4 French, 3 Romanian, 4 Dutch and 4 
Tunisian “children developing normally in a monolingual environment according to 
community standards” and video-recorded every two weeks from eight through to 
twenty five months. They recorded 529 hours in total and then they transcribed the 
tapes using the International Phonetic Alphabet. The authors state that:  
(…) in the babbling period, children produced more vowels (60, 378) than 
consonants (51,269). (…) In the early word period, children produced an 
approximately equivalent frequency of vowels (21,952) and consonants (20,726). 
(…) In the later word period, children produced more consonants (79,058) than 
vowels (72,646). (Kern, Davis, Zink 2009: 214) 
They conclude their study, by saying that: 
Only in later word period, when the children were producing a much larger number 
of meaningful words, was there an explosion of phonetic diversification signalling 
emergence of complexity in production system capacities. Emergence of later 
appearing sounds, including fricative, affricate, and liquid manners of articulation 
and dorsal and glottural places of articulation was apparent. Expansion of the 
vowel space to include diverse vowel types not related to the LLQ
3
 constraint was 
also apparent in the later word period. This increase in output complexity seems 
largely related to more control over speech production system enabling increase in 
capacities for matching language forms. Increases were not clearly related to 
precise ambient language patterns of input as they were consistent across 
languages. (Kern, Davis, Zink 2009: 226) 
                                                          
3
 LLQ – lower left part of the vocalic space vowels; described as being most frequent 
in early production inventories across a number of studies in this period.  
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It is anthropological pragmatics which is best-equipped with research methods to 
inquire into the particulars of children acquiring their native or first language. 
Hence, it is this discipline which should be responsible for registering and describing 
all the possible everyday situations in which small children are exposed to language 
and, what is more, its task should also be to record all the natural (so to say, an ideal 
model), prototypical verbal methods of information exchange with other users of the 
language in question. These renderings of natural language verbal exchanges, 
together with detailed descriptions of the specific situations of speaking, could then 
serve as the basis of blueprints for learners and teachers of foreign languages who 
actually learn entire discourse structures together with the linguistic forms which 
naturally go with them.                  
 
5. On linguistic philosophy 
In his discussion of the intersection of anthropology and pragmatics Koyama (2006: 
306) observes that the “(…) genuinely pragmatic tradition often known as the social 
sciences, includes anthropology and sociology, the origin of which goes back to 
Bronisław Malinowski (1884 – 1942), [Max] Weber (1864 – 1920), Georg Simmel 
(1858 – 1918), Emilé Durkheim (1858 – 1912), [Franz] Boas (1858 – 1942), Karl 
Marx (1818 – 1883), Alexander [von] Humboldt (1769 – 1859) and ultimately the 
Enlightenment philosophers such as the Marquis de Condorcet (1743 – 1794), 
Voltaire (1694 – 1778), and perhaps even the earlier Giambattista Vico (1668 – 
1744).” However, according to Koyama (2006: 306) it is Johann Herder (1744 – 
1803) who is supposed to be the most prominent figure in the current discussion. 
Herder was a student of Immanuel Kant, “(…) who critically accepted Kant‟s 
critical philosophy and, in doing this, launched a metacritique of the latter, 
especially of its claim to human (and even „anthropological‟ – the term is Kant‟s 
own) universality. In Herder‟s view, such alleged universality is no more than an 
ideology, conditioned by the historic, geographic, and cultural (that is, contextual) 
factors peculiar to the Idealist philosopher Kant and his times, i.e., the modern era of 
the German (secularised Lutheran) Enlightenment” (Koyama 2006: 306). Herder 
attacked “(…) Kant‟s claim to universality by appealing to the cultural diversity of 
the empirical world(s)” (ibid.), which not too many years later led to Boas‟ idea of 
linguistic (and cultural) relativism.  
Anthropological pragmatics can by all means be situated within the discipline of 
linguistic philosophy and researched as such, for this sub-discipline of linguistics 
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clearly marks the linguistic turn in philosophy that occurred in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The above was very nicely underlined by Richard Rorty (1967: 
3), stating that:  
[by] (…) the recent philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy, I shall 
mean (…) the view that philosophical problems are problems which can be solved 
(or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the 
language we presently use. This view is considered by many of its proponents to be 
the most important philosophical discovery of our time, and, indeed, of the ages. By 
its opponents, it is interpreted as a sign of the sickness of our souls, a revolt against 
reason itself, and a self-deceptive attempt (in Russell‟s phrase) to procure by theft 
what one has failed to gain by honest toil. 
In the process of tracing the main trends in the development of pragmatics, Geoffrey 
Leech and Jenny A. Thomas conclude their introduction by stating that pragmatics, 
before it became a “significant factor in linguistic thinking” (Leech, Thomas 1990: 
173), was, at the beginning of the 1970s, considered by many to be just “(…) a 
„fringe subject‟ on the borders of philosophy and linguistics, to its present broad 
concern with linguistic communication in its social and cultural context” (ibid.). By 
the very fact that pragmatics is “(…) the study of meaning of linguistic utterances 
for their users and interpreters” (ibid.) This sub-discipline of anthropological 
linguistics locates itself also in the centre of the research interests of anthropologists 
seeking the linguistic and cultural patterns of communication, and ethnographers 
who describe those patterns in their natural milieux. 
If we presume that the formal subject matter of anthropology is based upon research 
into cultural forms and social rules, we again find ourselves in the centre of the 
research interests of sociologists and linguists, all of whom are approaching quite 
similar subject matters, albeit from different research perspectives. Nevertheless the 
research perspectives under discussion have a few common features, namely, all of 
them are interested in discovering how people form meaningful units of 
communication (both verbal and nonverbal) under variable circumstances, and 
within changing contextual embeddings (i.e., in dynamically changing situations, 
fluctuating social groups and evolving cultures). The above boils down to the fact 
that all the aforementioned researchers, in order to complete their research tasks, 
need to work with their discipline-specific research tools and research perspectives 
upon the same research objects, entering the vast field of anthropological 
pragmatics, so they can all meet their research objectives, and, ideally, come up with 
research models pertaining to their set study goals. 
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Needless to say, “(…) the everyday understanding of how the world works – turns 
out to be extraordinarily diverse, maddeningly inconsistent, and highly resistant to 
scepticism of any kind” (Herzfeld 2001: 1), and what is more, “(…) [t]here has 
clearly been an enormous expansion of the discipline‟s topical range since the 
Victorians‟ preoccupation with what they called savage societies” (Herzfeld 2001: 
2). Bearing the above in mind, I am going to present in this short work a few 
selected directions in which anthropological pragmatics has recently been 
developing. One needs to be aware that the first prerequisite for any single work of 
anthropology is to have achieved “(…) a rationality capable of transcending cultural 
boundaries” (Herzfeld 2001: 3), for only such a study which can detach itself from 
its own culture and place its emphasis upon the culture researched, can be truly 
called modern, and of great scientific value (for discussion see, e.g., Tambiah 1990). 
In this sense one can conduct an equal-terms study into science, magic or religion, 
all of which can be characterized by instances of ritualistic language which is 
abundant with:  
“[r]epetition and redundancy, as well as the simplification of language and a very 
low degree of reference to the things of the real social world (Tambiah 1979). While 
some rituals aim to change specific situations – curing rituals are an obvious case in 
point – they are, in the cosmological sense, about the reassertion of order” 
(underlying mine – P.C.) (Herzfeld 2001: 209).    
 
6. The anthropo-pragmatic ritual of aisatsu 
Such linguistic and extra-linguistic forms of culturally encoded ritual can be best 
seen in the anthropological pragmatics of Japanese routine formulae called aisatsu, 
the equivalent of which can stand in English for “greetings and farewells.” However, 
According to Risako Ide (2007: 2) “(…) in addition to the notions of „greeting‟ and 
„farewell,‟ aisatsu contains a wider range of pragmatic acts such as „thanking,‟ 
„apologizing,‟ „introducing oneself,‟ „making congratulatory remarks,‟ „giving 
speeches,‟ and so on.” What is more, “[o]n the non-verbal side, aisatsu may include 
the act of bowing or head-tilt in recognition of others. It may be an act of shaking 
hands, or bows accompanying words of thanking or apologizing, the exchange of 
name cards in a business context, and so forth” (Ide 2007: 3). Aisatsu, most 
unexpectedly for its European or American users, being “typically exchanged among 
people in talk in action, (…) can also be extended to the spirits of the ancestors, pets 
and other animals, personified objects such as natural sceneries like mountains or 
Vol. 3, no. 1/2011                                                    STYLES OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 63 
rivers (Ide 2007: 3), which could be regarded as being in perfect congruence with 
the Buddhist tradition of being one with the environment that one is engulfed by. 
Therefore, apart from being a purely linguistic exchange of messages, the 
communicative act of aisatsu has also quite a few important social functions to 
fulfil. Aisatsu can be used:  
(a) to confirm that some kind of interaction is about to take place [as an index of 
a speech act]; 
(b) to maintain a friendly relationship with the interlocutor [positive interpersonal 
stance-taking in order to ease communication on the peer level]; and 
(c) to ritualistically maintain the interpersonal relationship in a smooth, non-
problematic matter. (Suzuki 1981: 46, cited in Ide 2007: 3) 
 
Risako Ide (2007: 4) presents also a few examples of how, by means of aisatsu, one 
can mark non-verbal, contextual boundaries: 
The greeting ohayoo „good morning‟ may be exchanged among in-group members 
such as within families and between close friends, while konnichiwa „hello/good 
afternoon‟ is typically avoided among in-group members as this expression does not 
promote the casual feeling sensed in the former expression. 
The above points to the fact that by means of a particular linguistic choice one is 
also indexing one‟s place within or outside a particular discourse community, which 
can sometimes result in the fact that, “(…) for this reason (…) college students on 
campus or employees in the workplace prefer to use „good morning‟ when greeting 
their in-group members even when they meet up during the afternoon periods” 
(ibid.). Interestingly, “(…) aisatsu of encounters and farewells are repeated over and 
over during a stretch of time especially when the encounter is formal as in the 
repetitious act of bowing (…) [, which can] indicate that aisatsu is not just a one-
time act, but a repeated action to confirm the social interdependence with each 
other” (ibid.). Having aisatsu in mind as our key example here, one can rest assured 
that the cultures of the world are abundant with linguistic forms of this or similar 
types of information exchanges, where interlocutors fully adjust their verbal 
messages and their non-verbal behaviour to the contextual embedding, and the 
mastering of which is more of a socio-cultural acquisition than anything else (see, 
for instance, the discussion of Jamaican proverbs seen as fully interactional and 
pragmatic units in Knapik 2011; or the discussion of hierarchical relationships and 
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kin vs. non-kin members in the Wolof greeting system in Senegal in Irvine 1974). In 
this place one has to agree with Herzfeld (2001) and Da Matta (1991: 23) that via 
the power of repeated action transformed into ritual one attempts to “(…) bring 
under some kind of collective control the human attempt to defer mortality, to create 
unique moments in the dead stretches of experience – routine, boredom, 
regimentation – that serve the interests of power” (Herzfeld 2001: 209). This 
particular form of power relationships is often manifested through language (and 
other cultural patterns of human behaviour) and can be studied within 
anthropological pragmatics under the name of discursive practices, for they “(…) are 
not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical 
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission 
and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them” 
(Foucault 1980a: 200). 
 
7. Language-created relationships of power  
The power of language, presented by Roger Fowler (1992: 258), forms a very 
interesting research issue, where “[p]ower is an asymmetrical relationship between 
A and B, where A and B may be individuals (doctor/patient, parent/child), 
institutions (court of law/trade unions), or a mixture (welfare organization/ 
individual claimant).” What is very important is the fact that “[t]he relationship is 
based on the unequal distribution of some crucial commodity or attribute, such as 
money, material goods, political opportunity, knowledge, ascribed role or status; 
what is „crucial‟ varies from society to society, and from time to time” (ibid.). The 
changing variables mentioned by Roger Fowler are the constitutive elements of what 
Michael Silverstein (1975) calls “cultural acts” which also vary from one speech 
community to another. In light of the above Fowler (1992: 258) understands 
language to be “(…) not a reflex of independent social relations(…)”, but rather as 
“(…) a social practice which is strongly instrumental in the construction and 
reproduction of (…) [power relationships – P.C.].” It is so due to the fact that both, 
language and power “(…) are theorized to be distinct entities, both variable” (Fowler 
1992: 258). Fowler explains the above, adding that “[i]n a given social setting, 
specific interpersonal relationships amount to a certain position in the field of 
power: thus in a classroom, teachers have more power than students, as a result of 
differentials of age, physical strength, and socio-economic class, and of their 
ascribed roles in that particular institutional setting” (ibid.). Similarly one can find 
quite a few other social settings with a distorted balance of power, e.g., the 
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relationships between doctors and patients in hospital; lawyers vs. their clients; 
officers vs. privates in the army; political leaders vs. regular party members in their 
constituencies; priests vs. the faithful in church, and so on. All the above-mentioned 
relationships happen to function within their specific nonverbal embeddings and can 
be analysed as very specific cultural acts in which one can note particular verbal 
communicative behaviour accompanying other nonverbal, social behaviour. Michael 
Foucault (1980b: 131) calls the entire process “the political production of truth”, 
which is a very culture-specific process, for: 
[t]ruth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of 
truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts 
and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements.  
The verbal behaviour of any cultural act can be further analysed as a series of 
consecutive culture-dependent speech acts. In other words, anthropological 
pragmatics an be used for researching ideology, for it is language which 
continuously articulates it, and it is ideology, “(…) which relates directly to social 
practice, and, (…) varies according to circumstances” (Fowler 1992: 259). Ideology 
understood in the above way can also be called “a linguistic representation of the 
world” which is a socially constructed representation that is “(…) effected largely 
through language in cooperation with other semiotic systems” (ibid.), like for 
instance some nursery rhymes, which are nothing less than stereotypical 
misprojections of reality which can create undesirable attitudes towards other people 
in children (see the notorious Polish nursery rhyme which has been published for 
years in many elementary school books which starts in the following way: 
“Murzynek Bambo w Afryce mieszka, czarną na skórę ten nasz koleżka…” [Pol.] “A 
black Bambo-boy in Africa lives, so black is the skin of this little fellow…” – P.C.).       
 
8. Folk linguistics and stance-taking 
Folk linguistics, and consequently folk pragmatics, appear to be disciplines 
intending to collect meta-information regarding the way in which language and 
language-related activities are seen by mainstream language users. Nancy 
Niedzielski and Dennis Preston (2007: 1) are of the opinion that: “[f]olk linguistics 
(FL) aims to discover and analyze beliefs about attitudes towards language at every 
level of linguistic production, perception, and cognitive embedding by collecting 
Vol. 3, no. 1/2011                                                    STYLES OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 66 
and examining overt comment about it by non-linguists (…)”. FL researchers have 
employed a range of techniques in order to have their respondents “(…) discuss or 
respond to areas of language concern that expose not merely their traditional, 
prepackaged notions, but also the processes that govern their thinking” (ibid.), 
having said the above, Nancy Niedzielski and Dennis Preston equal folk linguistics 
with “folk belief which is for them about language (…), a dynamic process that 
allows non-specialists (i.e., persons with no formal training in linguistics) to express 
their understandings of their linguistic environment” (ibid.). Folk linguistics is also 
closely connected with the ethnography of speaking, “(…) where work in a variety 
of contexts has led to an enriched understanding of linguistic behavior” (Niedzielski, 
Preston 2007: 3), and what is more “FL also benefits the ethnography of speaking by 
providing richer detail about the folk ethnography surrounding language itself, data 
perhaps too often derived from observation of performance than from the elicitation 
of opinion” (ibid.). One of the key concepts in understanding the subject matter and 
the methods of doing folk linguistics and folk pragmatics is the fact that: 
Linguists have created an agreed-on but fictitious abstraction (THE LANGUAGE) 
by pretending that there is a group of error-free, monodialectal, monostylistic 
speakers. (…) [L]inguists know that the real basis of language, however, is 
embedded in the brains of individual speakers. The folk, in contrast, appear to 
believe in their abstraction (also called THE LANGUAGE) (…), since they take it to 
be real, they also believe that individual language competencies somehow derive 
from it. Linguists know, however, that varieties (in fact idiolects themselves) are the 
only authentic cognitive examples of THE LANGUAGE (…). (Preston 2006: 525). 
Folk linguists, with their research methodology closely related to the ethnography of 
communication, situates itself within the scope of the subject matter of ethnography, 
and as such fully locates itself within the range of interest of anthropological 
pragmatics.  
Another current and quite promising research direction within anthropological 
pragmatics appears to be linguistically oriented research into stance-taking, defined 
as: “(…) a person‟s expression of their relationship to their talk, their epistemic 
stance – e.g., how certain they are about their assertions, and a person‟s expression 
of their relationship to their interlocutors (their interpersonal stance – e.g., friendly 
or dominating)” (Kiedling 2009: 172). One can observe quite a few public and 
personal stances one can construct, as has been mentioned above, epistemic or 
interpersonal ones, the important thing is the fact that stance-taking and stances are 
usually related linguistic choices which are made under certain contextual 
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circumstances; they are dynamic (new choices can always be added to previous 
ones), they can always change (due to new experiences, priorities, etc.), and they can 
depend and vary according to the stances of our interlocutors. Stance-taking is also a 
cultural phenomenon which is deeply rooted in the particular self-building strategy 
of both individual members of a speech community or entire ethnic groups.          
 
9. Instead of conclusions 
In his introduction to “Evolutionary pragmatics” Wolfgang Wildgen (2007) observes 
that “[i]n a speech delivered in Harvard in 1872 Ch. S. Pierce sketched his 
„Pragmatism‟ as a philosophy based on the practical consequences of intellectual 
operations.” Adding that: “[t]he term „pragmatic‟ refers to Kant‟s Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht. From the beginning [1798 – P.C.], pragmatics had therefore 
a strong link to anthropology (cf. Kant) and evolutionary theory (cf. Darwin) with its 
central concept of adaptation (cf. Verscheueren & Brisard 2002).” Bearing the above 
in mind would perhaps point towards the somewhat subversive conclusion that it 
was actually anthropological pragmatics as such at the very heart of its philosophical 
beginnings, and then after a relatively long time in the history of science it entered 
linguistic sciences under the heading of pragmatics in the late 1960s.     
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